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Abstract. The human-centred security research area came into being
about fifteen years ago, as more and more people started owning their
own computers, and it became clear that there was a need for more fo-
cus on the non-specialist computer user. The primary attitude fifteen
years ago, in terms of how these new users were concerned, was one of
exasperation and paternalism. The term “stupid user” was often heard,
often muttered sotto voce by an IT specialist dealing with the aftermath
of a security incident. A great deal of research has been published in this
area, and after pursuing some unfruitful avenues a number of eminent
researchers have started to focus on the end-user’s perceptions and un-
derstandings. This has come from a realisation that end users are not
the opponents, but rather allies in the battle against those carrying out
nefarious activities. The most promising research direction currently ap-
pears to be to focus on mental models, a concept borrowed from the
respected and long-standing field of Psychology and, in particular, cog-
nitive science. The hope is that if we understand the end-user and his/her
comprehension of security better, we will be able to design security so-
lutions and interactions more effectively. In this paper we review the
research undertaken in this area so far, highlight the limitations thereof,
and suggest directions for future research.
1 Introduction
Over the last few years a number of different security mechanisms have been de-
veloped in order to protect users from different kinds of attacks eg. the SSL/TLS
protocol. Some of these mechanisms have been formally proven to be secure and
evaluated based on international security standards such as the Common Criteria
or ISO 27001. However, a number of user studies [82, 95], as well as the preva-
lence of attacks [61] successfully targeting the human end-user, demonstrate that
many of these security mechanisms falter and fail as soon as the user is involved
in the process. One big problem is the large number of security warnings users
are confronted with. Users are habituated into ignoring these since they do not
understand and thus perceive any risk [94].
This can either be attributed to the ‘stupidity’ of the user (not understand-
ing what is secure and what is not) or the ‘obtuseness’ of the developers (not
designing systems properly and not giving due consideration to the non-security
related nature of the end-user’s primary goal or task). As a solution, one could
try to eliminate the end-user from the security mechanism’s operation altogether.
While this might work in a few cases (eg. virus scanners and firewalls), there
are many contexts in which this is not advisable, for many reasons, as discussed
in the paper ‘Security Automation Considered Harmful?’ [40]. For instance, in
some cases eliminating the user could restrict functionality to such an extent
that users will reject the mechanism (e.g. preventing users from visiting https
web servers which do not possess extended validation certificates). There are also
applications where user input is mandated by law. For example, the user has to
be able to verify the correct processing of their vote when voting electronically.
Instead of eliminating the user altogether, one could try to force users to
behave securely by defining corresponding policies or (long) lists of security and
privacy rules and guidelines and try to compel the user to comply. In some cases
users are punished for non-compliance, or at least threatened with sanctions [53].
This does not really work very well, at least in the way policies are designed
nowadays [88]. For instance, policies often forbid actions that human nature
almost compels eg. password sharing between colleagues in order to perform the
primary goal/task effectively.
Wash and Rader [106] argue against all these options. It is far better, argue
Wash and Rader and other researchers [106, 19, 5, 1], for developers to align nec-
essary security-specific user interactions, educational endeavours and risk com-
munication efforts with users’ mental models and capabilities. Users’ actions and
decisions are directed by their mental models so it is crucial for designers and
developers to know and understand their models when developing and designing
security mechanisms. The design should be aligned with the end-users’ men-
tal models but not, as is nowadays often the case, purely with the developers’
and designers’ mental models and based on their assumptions about end-users’
mental models and capabilities. Risk communication, particularly, can only be
effective if it does not only depend on the nature of the risk but also on the
alignment between the conceptual model embedded in the risk communication
and the users’ mental model(s) related to the context and reality of the risk.
Risk communication is an important aspect of Human-Centered Security as it
is implicit in each warning.
Mental models also influence trust and acceptance of technology: An incorrect
mental model can make users mistrust insecure technologies [21]. This constitutes
yet another reason for paying attention to end users’ mental models.
In this paper we focus on aligning interactions and risk communication with
the users’ mental models. The first goal of this paper is to provide security re-
searchers with an introduction to mental models and lessons learned from other
disciplines in which they have been successfully applied for many years. We also
address mechanisms by which mental models are modified (either implicitly or
explicitly). This is important because mental models are not static but rather
change over time and differ between users or groups. The second objective is
to provide an overview of existing security-related research on mental models
in human-centred security. The mental models identified in the literature are
summarized to inform the development of future security mechanisms and, in
particular, security-related user interactions or the improvement of existing in-
teractions including risk communication. Finally, we identify some limitations in
the research, and the findings, and speculate about how these can be mitigated
in future human-centred security mental model research.
2 Mental Models — Introduction and Overview
The term ‘Mental Model’ was first used by Craik [28] in 1943 in his book ti-
tled “The nature of explanation”. Craik explained that a mental model was a
physical working model which works in the same way as the process it parallels”
(p. 4.2). Yet others described the concept of mental model before that, even
though they used different terminology. Johnson-Laird [58] wrote a history of
mental models and points out that Ludwig Boltzmann, writing in 1890, spoke
about “constructing an image of the external world that exists only internally”.
The literature on mental models uses a range of terms and nomenclature, which
makes the field somewhat challenging to investigate, with researchers using the
following range of terms to refer to internal constructs of the world: analogy [29],
metaphors [69, 56], perception [43, 97], theme [51], theory [98], internal concept
[25] and reasoning [67]. For the purposes of this discussion we will use the term
“mental model”.
In 1983, two books with the words “Mental Model” in the title were pub-
lished [57, 48]. Gentner and Stevens [48] argue that a study of mental models is
beneficial since it helps us to understand human knowledge about the world. The
first chapter in their book is written by Don Norman, who explains that men-
tal models provide both a predictive and explanatory power for understanding
our interaction with our environment, with other people and with technologi-
cal artefacts. He also emphasises that the models are always evolving, are not
necessarily accurate but that they do have to be functional.
Rouse and Morris [91] provide a definition of mental models that seems
generic enough to encapsulate the meaning of all the different terminologies:
“mechanisms whereby humans generate descriptions of system purpose and form,
explanations of system functioning and systems states, and predictions of future
system states” (p.49).
In the same paper, Rouse and Morris warn that any research into mental
models, while it might deliver an understanding of the what of the mental model,
cannot deliver an understanding of how the human uses it. For example, even
if a person possesses a comprehensive mental model, and knows how to act
in a particular situation, it is particularly difficult to control for the impact
of emotions [100]. Emotions are an imponderable which can make competent
people (with perfect mental models) perform poorly. Consequently, even having
identified mental models does not necessarily mean that they can be used to
predict how people will deploy them in a particular situation.
The subsequent discussion will provide further insights into the intricacies of
mental models while focusing on those aspects that are important for security
researchers and developers to take cognisance of. This includes considerations of
how mental models can be measured, developed and fostered.
2.1 Important properties and aspects of mental models
In 1985, Rouse and Morris [91] suggest that the two important aspects are (1)
how the model is manipulated (ranging from implicit to explicit) and (2) how
much discretion the human has in developing the model (ranging from none to
full). They also identify a number of issues which beset mental model research.
These are phrased as pertinent questions below, and a review of related literature
provides a brief discussion of each:
To what extent is it possible to capture the details of mental models?
Norman [80] warn that mental models are incomplete and unstable, and some-
times confused with each other. Also Jones et al. [59] say that mental models
are “inconsistent representations” which “adapt to continually changing circum-
stances and to evolve over time”. Given that this is true, how can one know
that a study has delineated one particular mental model, in its entirety, without
corruption from others? Researchers generally attempt to gain access to mental
models by asking people to verbalise their understanding of a particular concept.
Intuitively this seems a reasonable approach. Bostrom [15] et al. used interviews
to determine whether the lay public have an understanding of the dangers of
radon. They justify their use of interviews but acknowledge the potential for
cognitive entrapment to occur. Unfortunately, Payne [83] found that when peo-
ple were asked to verbalise their mental models of a particular construct, in
their case bank machines, the ad hoc nature of the description was striking.
Payne noted that people deployed mixed explanation types, where they mixed
pre-existing conceptions with new insights and generally expressed something
that was heterogeneous and it often seemed to evolve as they spoke. So elicit-
ing verbalisations might well not be the best way of capturing details of mental
models accurately. Also Richardson et al. [89] showed that attempts to elicit
mental models ran the risk of distorting them.
Rowe and Cooke [92] carried out a comparison of four elicitation mechanisms:
think-aloud, laddering3, relatedness ratings and diagramming in order to deter-
mine the link between the quality of the resulting mental model representation
3 The interviewer gives the participant a series of problem statements and asks them
to identify four relevant aspects of the problem and then asks in-depth questions in
order to explore linkages between answers the participant gives
and the troubleshooting ability of the participant. They found think-aloud to be
particularly weak in this respect. They argue that laddering and rating appear
to measure different aspects of the mental model, seeming to confirm the argu-
ment made by Staggers and Norcio [99] about the multi-faceted and dynamic
nature of mental models including hierarchies of models or related models that
are subtypes or specialisms of others. Rowe and Cooke also reported that the
diagram quality was predictive of troubleshooting performance, suggesting that
a sound mental model leads to a high quality diagram. Langan-Fox et al. [73]
review a number of different techniques for eliciting mental models, and offer
a methodology for choosing the optimal elicitation mechanism, depending on
the research problem being investigated as well as the practical and theoretical
considerations of the study.
Important to know: Accessing a mental model is challenging because one
runs the risk of interfering with what one is attempting to measure. Even so,
it is important to elicit mental models and, in the process, try to alter them
as little as possible. Drawing diagrams where applicable seems to be the most
promising approach.
Fig. 1. Adapted from Richardson et al.’s [89] model
Do cues help to draw out the details of mental models? Since it is
so challenging to elicit mental models it is worth considering the use of cues,
both in elicitation and in assisting a user in correctly diagnosing a particular
situation. Richardson et al. [89] apply a systems model approach4 and claim
the following primary mental model components: intentions, perceptions, system
structures and plans. They see the mental model through the lens of a cybernetic
loop, with the person interacting with the external system state and perceiving
4 A conceptual model of a system which attempts to depict causatives and influences
leading to outcomes.
changes in order to close the feedback loop (Figure 1 - left). They then extend
their model, as shown on the right of Figure 1, to include the presence of cues, as
mediating between the actual state of the system, and the perceived state of the
system, showing the importance of cues that the human can interpret in order
to understand the state of the system. They explain that cues are the signals
that humans pay attention to, and argue that it is critical to understand how
people use strategies and tactics are employed, and how such cues are interpreted.
Dörner [35] explains that cues help to complete the feedback loop, thus helping
people to build a more accurate mental model.
Even though cues are important it seems difficult to guarantee that cues
will be efficacious. For example, visual cues are often missed, due to attentional
limitations [96]. Even if someone notices a cue, sometimes they don’t respond
to it because they don’t have the prior knowledge to understand it [87]. Even
if they do have the necessary understanding, they may not react correctly due
to emotional issues [39]. Finally, even if they notice the cue, know how to react,
and their emotional state is such that they are able to react correctly, they may
still misinterpret the cue if they do not trust its source [54].
Important to know: Cueing is simple and understandable in well-known
contexts such as the theatre. When the cueing context is a human operating
within a complex system, provision of a cue that will be noticed, interpreted
and acted upon as intended is very difficult indeed.
How are mental models encoded in the brain (content /structure/
specificity)? Mental Models develop as humans experience life events [93], and
are also impacted by the collective mental models of the group the person inhab-
its [59]. Such experiences can include exposure to media reports [70], culture [8]
and education and training [104]. Moreover since human experience is as individ-
ual and unique as humans themselves, it is clear that mental models will differ
from person to person depending on individual information processing strategies
[90] even in people with similar backgrounds. The resulting mental model might
well differ in representation format from person to person.
There is some speculation about whether they are analogical or spatial [83],
or organized hierarchically [102] or as a cognitive collage [103]. Since the human
brain can be considered one of the final, as yet uncharted, frontiers, it is possible
that any attempt to pin down the precise mental model storage mechanism will
be futile.
There is likely to be a difference in specificity too, especially when one com-
pares novices and experts. Staggers and Norcio [99] provide some references to
show that experts’ mental models are more abstract and richer than those of
novices [112]. They refer to the expert model as a macro model, that represents
a higher level of functioning than novices’ models. In addition to being more ab-
stract, Thatcher and Greyling [102] also report that experts have more complete
and detailed mental models. It is clear then that novices have an understanding
of a particular problem situation, but do not possess sufficiently abstract mental
models which enable them to extract core principles from such an understand-
ing. This means they cannot necessarily apply their models to solve problems
which are different in specifics but generically similar.
Important to know: Mental models are based on past general and educational
experiences. Moreover, it seems that the process which makes someone an expert
also results in an abstracting process, so that they develop generic mental models
which can be applied to a wide variety of contexts.
How should the development of correct mental models be encouraged?
If one wishes to impart a mental model one always has to contend with the per-
son’s prior knowledge and experience. In terms of topic-specific prior knowledge
there are three possibilities:
The topic is completely new to the learner. How best ought we to develop
mental models in the minds of learners? It is important to ascertain people’s
understandings and assumptions, and to ensure that one matches educational
delivery to these [110]. If the new material is not ’pitched correctly the lecturer
runs the risk of either boring or confounding the listener. If this happens the
intended mental model will not develop.
The learner has a correct but limited mental model of the topic. One should
try to elicit some sense of what the person already knows [26] and then try to
provide links to this knowledge so as to ease extension of the pre-existing mental
model [101].
The learner has an incorrect mental model of the topic. Chapman and Fer-
folja [23] outline the consequences of poor learning, and consequent imperfect
mental models. They term the outcome as disruptive. It is especially damaging
if further learning needs to build on a mental model that is faulty since the mis-
understanding then impacts the entire learning process. Bain [7] explain that we
need to prove that mental models are incorrect nefore they will realise that they
need to change the way they see something. Having understood this, people can
be helped to unlearn concepts, but it seems that this needs to be facilitated ex-
plicitly: one cannot merely present people who hold an incorrect understanding
with the correct information [22]. This is time-consuming and effortful and so
this situation should be avoided if possible.
One of the most common examples of incorrect models is demonstrated by
shared, incorrect yet commonly held folk models [30]. Some examples include
beliefs about diabetes by Bangladeshi British (incorrect eg. believing living in
Britain caused diabetes) [49], shared models of infection in an English suburban
community (incorrect eg. feed a cold, starve a fever) [55], understanding about
heat loss from houses (incorrect eg. closing off rooms preserves energy) [65]. The
danger of incorrect folk models is that they resist scientific checks which would
highlight their flaws and are too easily generalised to situations they were never
meant to be applied to [31]. A primary example of the resistance of folk models
to change is the MMR controversy in the UK, where many parents believed that
the vaccine would lead to autism, despite scientific evidence to the contrary [18].
It is difficult to challenge folk models, since they are so resistant to change.
People’s mental models are formed by life experiences, and informed by edu-
cational activities. As security researchers and practitioners, we need to under-
stand how to design our educational endeavours so as to maximise the develop-
ment of correct mental models. Morey and Frangioso[77] present six principles
of effective learning: (1) acknowledging the person’s existing mental models (2)
fostering an understanding of the complexity of human-machine systems (3)
challenge unthinking assumptions (4) listen to learners in order to understand
where they are coming from (5) observe, assess, design and then implement (6)
let learners teach others. These seem to deal with all of the possibilities men-
tioned above.
Important to know: In First Aid, the golden rule is “Do No Harm”. In
teaching, that should be our mantra too [17]. An effective teacher will first
determine pre-existing assumptions, then challenge those that are faulty, then
pitch the new material in order to match pre-existing knowledge, and finally
facilitate peer to peer discussions to ensure that the new material is emphasised
and remembered [23].
In conclusion. Mental models are obviously complicated multi-faceted men-
tal entities, they are dynamic, based on individual experiences, are not easily
described, combine many different modalities, are different between different
groups and in particular between lay persons and experts, and are very difficult
for researchers to capture. Finally, any attempt to capture the details of mental
models are likely to change such models, and researchers have to be sure that
they do not affect mental models during the process of measuring them. More-
over, when we become aware of an incorrect mental model we need to confront
the holder(s) with the inconsistencies and imperfections of this model, so that
we can guide them towards a correct model.
2.2 Example Applications of Mental Models
Mental model research has been deployed successfully in a variety of contexts.
Application areas. For example, Littman et al. [75] instructed programmers
to develop two different kinds of mental models of software: the first was a
systematic strategy and the second the as-needed strategy. Using the first, the
programme attempts to trace the data flow all the way through the code where
the latter focuses attention only on local code without consider antecedents.
They found that the former strategy was by far the more effective in leading
to better software maintenance. Pfeffer [84] explains how best to change the
mental models of senior managers in organisations. Converse et al. [27] describe
how best to foster shared mental models so that teams operate more effectively.
Finally Nemire [79] relates how an incorrect mental model of how roller coasters
operate led to a fatality, and argue for the need for specific educational efforts
in order to address incorrect mental models.
Risk Communication vs. HCI. Fischoff et al. [44] write about the impor-
tance of aligning risk communication with people’s perceptions, understandings
and assumptions. They also explain that emotions and social processes play a
role in how people make use of mental models in making risk decisions. They ac-
knowledge these confounding factors but argue for the need to get the cognitive
aspects right, which can be controlled. An example where emotions and outrage
overcame the best efforts of risk communicators is the MMR vaccine controversy
[18].
In the human-computer interaction (HCI) field mental models have also been
used to support design. Three examples serve to indicate the range of work in
this area. Bates [11] designed an information searching interface that modeled a
‘berry picking’ metaphor which is better aligned to human information search-
ing behaviour than traditional information retrieval interfaces. Khaslavsky [66]
attempted to design an interface which was sensitive to cultural mental models
but does not report on an evaluation of the interface. Finally, Donker et al. [34]
determined that blind users had different mental models of an interface from
sighted users, and designed an interface specifically for them.
3 Mental Models in Security Research
The only way to develop security mechanisms that effectively protect users
against attackers is to align the design of security-related interactions, educa-
tional efforts and risk communication with users’ mental models and capabili-
ties. Users only protect themselves if their mental model includes some concept
vulnerability to attacks. It might be necessary to attempt to adapt, extend or
modify the target users’ mental models in order maximise the possibility that
users will act, and act correctly, to protect themselves from potential attacks.
The common knowledge about mental models presented in the previous sec-
tion offers a suitable launching pad for a discussion of their use in security-
related research. In particular, security researchers and developers of security
mechanisms and security critical applications need to understand how end users
mentally model their systems, and the security thereof (with or without taking
additional security-related actions), and how they understand the effects of their
actions on these systems.
As a consequence, security researchers have been conducting mental model
research from different perspectives and using a variety of different methods to
elicit their details. Many different methods have been applied, including: differ-
ent types of interviews, user studies, and card sorting. Some researchers carry
out the research in order to design security-related interactions more effectively,
some to communicate risk, some to tailor educational efforts, and some to eval-
uate whether specific user interactions and interfaces lead to appropriate mental
models. Such models are crucial in leading users to make informed security de-
cisions.
Here we provide an overview of the most important research that has been
conducted in the area of human-centred security, presenting findings and limi-
tations. We also present and discuss research on mental model research which
is intended to improve security interfaces, such as firewalls, anonymous creden-
tials and Single Sign-On. We commence this discussion by presenting concrete
security-related models identified in literature and continue by summarizing the
general findings.
3.1 Concrete Mental Models of Threats and Security Mechanisms
Jean Camp [19] identified mental models of security and privacy based on a
literature review, i.e. mental models that are currently indirectly or directly
being used to communicate security and privacy issues. These are:
– Physical Security Model (e.g. because of the lock metaphors)
– Medical Model (e.g. because of the phrase ‘infected by a virus’)
– Criminal Model (e.g. being arrested if you hack into a system)
– Warfare Model (e.g. because of intrusion detection and firewall tools)
– Market Model (e.g. because of people losing money)
Camp discusses these in detail, outlining their positive and negative impacts on
user behaviour, with respect to security decisions. She explains that each of the
models only covers parts of the security and privacy problems and thus only
helps to protect against a subset of possible attacks. For instance, the Physical
Security Model helps to protect the computer hardware but does not preserve
privacy in terms of how much information one should provide using different
services. Camp et al. [76] validated these five models using card sorting and
interviews while distinguishing between experts and lay-persons. They found
out that many of the studied security risks were either assigned to the Physical
Security or the Criminal Models. However, they also conclude, that none of the
five mental models “fit the understanding of the impression of the related risk”
[76]. The Physical Security Model was also indirectly supported by results of
Furman et al. , [46] as they show that end-users have most trust in banks (due
to their physical protection) and and shops that they know in the physical world.
Rick Wash published a interview-based study [105] in which he indentifies
folk models of security threats that are used by north American home computer
users to decide what security software to use and which security advice to follow.
He derived eight distinct folk models and explained how people used these to
justify ignoring security advice. The mental model they ascribed to influenced
whether or not they made backups, whether they installed anti-virus software
and whether they were open to advice about their security-related actions or not.
For example, some believed that one could only catch a virus if you visited a bad
part of the Internet and thus did not think they were vulnerable. Some believed
that they themselves were too insignificant to be worthy of a hacker’s attentions,
and thought they were therefore not at risk. Some also believed that hackers were
only after large databases or companies and that they, as individuals, would
not be attacked. Wash points out that efforts to explain how virus-protection
software works to protect computers might encourage end-users to use it. Some
advice was routinely ignored but not by all mental models. In summary, he
identified the following models (four for risks and four for attacker types):
– Virus — generally bad but only high level understanding
– Virus causes mischief i.e. annoying problems with computer/data.
– Virus intentionally downloaded in buggy software computer will misbehave
in time: e.g. crash or does not boot any more.
– Virus supports crime e.g. by stealing personal/financial information.
– Hackers perceived as geeks who want to impress friends.
– Hackers are criminals who target big fish (rich and important people).
– Hackers support crime, looking for large databases of info
– Hackers are burglars who steal personal/financial information
Kauer et al. [62] replicated this study in Germany. They found, in total,
eleven folk models, with the eight from Rick Wash being mentioned with small
differences. In addition, the authors identified: Viruses are Governmental soft-
ware, Hackers are Governmental Officials referring to the Bundestrojaner and
Staatstrojaner (engl. Federal Trojan horse) as well as Hackers are Stakeholders
with individual and opportunistic purposes such as Anonymous5 and the Chaos
Computer Club6. With respect to the first two extra models, all participants
said that the government only acted if there were suspicion of some crime. With
respect to the latter model, participants did not fear being targeted, since these
stakeholders are perceived to be more interested in media-effective targets. The
government was also mentioned throughout the interviews conducted by Furman
et al. [46]. Considering the question about whom or what users need to protect
themselves from, their participants also mentioned colleagues and scammers (in
addition to hackers, bad guys, and criminals).
Dourish et al. [36] also probed mental models of security using interviews.
They identified four classes of threats:
– Hackers cause mischief and harm; vandalism; the least commonly identified
threat.
– Stalkers get information online but can also continue their activities offline.
– Spammers advertise by means of unsolicited messaging which is perceived as
a type of denial-of-service attack.
– Marketers invade individual privacy by surreptitiously collecting information
about activities, purchasing patterns, etc.
Weirich and Sasse [108] also conducted interviews to explore perceptions
of who they thought tried to get into other people’s accounts and whom they
targeted. The identified models for the first question were:
– Kids: only want to prove that they can do it, but do not cause serious harm;
– Vandals: plain mad, who cause serious harm;
– Criminals: only attack online-banking;
– Vengeful people: disagree with individual or organization;
– Others: industrial spies, terrorists, and jokers.
5 http://du-bist-anonymous.de/
6 https://www.ccc.de/en/
Friedmann et al. [45] identified mental models related to secure connections.
The authors conducted 72 interviews (including drawings) and, in particular,
asked how the participants to decided whether a connection was secure or not.
They also asked what a secure connection meant to them. They identified five
strategies with respect to the first question: (1) HTTPS; (2) lock/key icon; (3)
point in transaction (main pages are usually not secured); (4) type of information
requested, and (5) type of webpage. The last two are particularly interesting as
this means that people assume that when sensible data is requested (like pass-
words or credit card information) the server ensures that the connection is secure.
Similarly, they assume that organisations such as banks take due care. Regard-
ing the second question (meaning of secure connection), the authors identified
three mental models:
– Transit: protecting the confidentiality of information while it moves between
entities.
– Encryption: specific mechanism for encoding/decoding messages.
– Remote Side: protecting data once it arrives at recipient. From the draw-
ings, one can conclude that people with this mental model assume that the
connection is either always secured, secured by default secured or unsecured
since it there is no way for anyone to interfere with the transmitted message.
Benenson et al. [12] studied smartphone users with respect to privacy con-
cerns and awareness. They identified two different mental models: the Android
and the iPhone mental model. They confirmed that Android users did seem to
be more privacy-concerned and -aware, as they significantly more often men-
tioned data privacy as an important factor for choosing an application. iPhone
users thought that if applications needed the required access they would not
necessarily ask. Moreover, iOS users were mostly unaware of application data
usage. These results are explained by the different ways Apple and Google chose
to inform users of applications’ data usage. Furthermore, the researchers found
that technical features were an important factor in informing smartphone choice.
People are more likely to own an Android phone if they cared about technical
features. People who were interested in technology were more likely to own an
iPhone.
3.2 Mental Models to Improve Interactions in Concrete
Applications (HCI)
HCI Sec researchers also studied mental models in the context of Interface design.
We report here about five different types of applications.
Anonymous Credentials. There is a great deal of technical research on
anonymous credential and privacy-friendly identity management. Wästlund et
al. [107] evaluated three different interfaces and three different corresponding
metaphors in a user study to explore the ideas behind anonymous credentials
namely card-based, attribute-based and adapted card-based metaphors. The ob-
jective was to test whether the built mental models of anonymous credentials
are correct for any of these approaches. Therefore, they asked the participants to
explain which information flows exist and who could violate anonymity. While
the adapted card-based technique performed best, further improvements are nec-
essary.
Firewalls. Raja et al. [85] base their research on firewall warnings on the
physical mental model described in [19] after having identified a number of mis-
conceptions with personal firewalls in [86] . They use this model to visualize the
functionality of a firewall. Their comparison with the Comodo personal firewall
shows that the visualization of a fireproof wall separating parts of a building
helps users to develop better mental models of firewalls. While most users pre-
ferred the warnings designed by Raja et al., some participants in their study
mentioned that they would take these new warnings less seriously than warnings
from Comodo.
Web Single Sign-On (SSO). Sun et al. [52] investigate, using interviews
and drawings, end-users’ perceptions of web SSO technology for authentication
and found many misconcepts causing mistrust in the whole approach and raising
privacy and security concerns. They re-designed the interfaces of a SSO solution
and show that many more participants would use and trust this “new” approach.
Password Manager. Chiasson et al. [24] studied two different password man-
agers and found that most of the identified problems were caused by inaccurate
or incomplete mental models of the software’s operation. For instance, most users
do not even have a high-level understanding of how password managers function.
The authors recommend more visibility (vs. more transparency) to enhance the
usability of password managers.
Secure E-Mail products. Whitten and Tygar [109] conducted a cognitive
walkthrough evaluation and a user study on PGP 5.0. From the cognitive walk-
through many problems were identified including those related to mental models
and metaphors e.g. the lack of differentiation between private and public keys.
The results from the user study showed that most users had difficulties with key
management and with understanding the underlying PKI concept, leading to
errors such as sending the secret unencrypted or encrypted with the wrong key.
3.3 General Findings
In this subsection, we provide the general findings on mental models in human-
centered security independent from concrete mental models. We first report
about a couple of general misconcepts and then about differences between dif-
ferent groups of users.
Problems with Diverse Antecendents. Computer users face different types
of problems: common computer problems (e.g. buggy program or disk failure)
and security / privacy7 problems. Gross and Rosson [51] conducted interviews to
better understand end-user security management based on the hypothesis that
people have difficulty distinguishing between these two kinds of problems. Their
findings in [51] seemed to confirm this. However, in a later paper [50], Gross
and Rosson showed, based on an online survey with 368 participants, that end-
users did indeed make a distinction between these problems. Furthermore, they
showed that end-users are more concerned with security and privacy problems
than with general computer failure.
Focus on Confidentiality. Furman et al. [46] interviewed 40 people about
their perceptions of security. They found that although the participants men-
tioned confidentiality, few mentioned the other two cornerstones of information
security: integrity and availability. This was confirmed by other researchers. For
example, in [45], the authors found out that people only considered confiden-
tiality and encryption in their definitions of secure connections. When it comes
to smartphone security, the situation is slightly different. When talking about
these devices, users do actually mention availability [78] but more in terms of
high mobility devices being more likely to be lost or stolen, thus referring to the
availability of the device rather than the data on the device.
Others being Responsible. Gross and Rosson [51] attempted to understand
end-user security management in companies and organizations. Most of their
participants attributed responsibility for security to the IT staff or to the or-
ganization or both but most emphatically not themselves. Furman et al. [46]
report a similar result in the home environment: people assign the responsibility
to third parties such as the government, software companies, credit card compa-
nies, banks, or IT professionals. Also, Dourish et al. [36] showed that end-users
were in favour of delegating responsibility, namely to technology, knowledgable
colleagues, family members, room mates, organizations and institutions such as
banks. According to an AOL/NCSA study8 from 2005, most people felt that the
responsibility laid with the government and with big companies (while at at least
15% felt that they themselves were responsible). Hence, it is not surprising that
many studies [16, 46, 36] confirmed that users are rather relaxed when it comes
to online banking as they assume the bank will take care (including ignoring
warnings for such pages [16]).
In the smartphone context, King [68] shows that end-users trust applications
because they assume that an in-depth evaluation has been carried out by Apple
and Google before these are provided in their stores. This was confirmed by
Kelley et al. [64] for Android users. The same observation was made in [81]
within the context of electronic voting: people assume that observers will make
sure that votes are properly tallied.
7 Note, although the focus of this subsection is on security some researchers have
studied both aspects together and thus those results are included here if they are
not only privacy specific.
8 http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/offices/help/pdf/safety_study_2005.
pdf
An opposing finding is reported by Furnell et al. [47], who found that 90% of
respondents (strongly) agreed with the phrase ‘It is my responsibility to protect
my computer from online attacks’. The difference might be caused by the ques-
tion being concrete about one aspect while the other studies posed more broad-
ranging open-ended questions. Moreover, it is possible that the direct question
asked by Furnell et al. might have been misunderstood by the participants in
the sense that it is not clear to them what is implicitly required; maybe they
thought it just meant that they should install a virus scanner. This mismatch is
a more general finding and is addressed in the next paragraph.
Lack of Awareness/Misunderstandings/Misapplication. Wash and Rader
[106] explain that users often believe they were doing what was necessary to pro-
tect their computers. They argue that users were motivated to take necessary
actions but obviously only against those attacks or threats they were aware of.
Gross and Rosson [51] also found that their participants believed themselves to
be able to sufficiently protect themselves, e.g. they know about Phishing, and
know that they should check for urgency-related terms and typos in emails. Un-
fortunately, their knowledge is often out of date. Similarly, they are aware that
software and passwords should be regularly updated and changed. However, reg-
ularly, to them, means six monthly. The authors of [6, 46, 47] drew similar conclu-
sions. For instance, most of the participants in [46] could identify the evaluated
trust and security seals/icons but did not understand what they meant. Differ-
ent researchers [64, 41, 74] report that smartphone users, in particular Android
users, express doubts about the permissions applications might have, but ex-
plain that they do not understand the explanations about permissions provided
at installation time.
Researchers could also show that there are situations in which the end-users
know very well how to behave but still decide, for arbitrary reasons, not to behave
securely: (1) When one considers smartphone authentication, the participants in
[78] mentioned that they knew they ought to use an authentication mechanism
but stated that the mechanism available on the phone was inappropriate. They
felt it was overly stringent if they wanted to access innocuous information such
as the weather forecast. Similar findings were reported by [68] with respect to
general security and privacy concerns on smartphones. (2) In [108], the authors
identified social aspects in organizational environments in the context of pass-
word security as one reason: not being a nerd but being a team player; and not
being paranoid. Similarly [78] reported that people explained that they did not
lock their smartphones because they did not want to type passwords in front of
their friends. To them, this made it look as if they wanted to hide something.
Some also felt that such an action would send a message that that they did not
trust their friends and this might compromise the relationship.
Misconcept of Hackers’ Targets. Weirich and Sasse’s [108] participants
mentioned the following targets: security-conscious organisations, high-profile
organizations, people with important information, and anyone who had annoyed
an attacker. Wash [105] confirmed their findings with his different folk mod-
els as well as others. This suggests that many people consider themselves too
insignificant to be attacked.
Dourish et al. [37] found that many of the non-specialist participants they
interviewed in their study reported feeling that their security efforts were futile.
They reported that they were unable to protect themselves from the efforts
of faceless and nameless attackers. Also participants in the interviews of [108]
argued that hackers could always find a way in despite their efforts. Wash [105]
reports that some of his participants felt powerless to protect themselves from
the efforts of hackers and therefore did not take any action to protect their
computers. Others believed that all they had to do was to make it harder for
hackers to get into their accounts than into those of other home computer owners,
what Wash refers to as the ‘speed bump’ theory. These findings were confirmed
by [36]: people referred to the ‘unknown other who will always be one step ahead’.
Differences between novices and experts. Several security researchers [76,
4, 47] confirmed the results reported by Staggers and Norcio [99] that experts’
mental models are more abstract and richer than those of novices (see also
Section 2.1). For instance, Asharpour et at. [4] showed that the mental model of
security risks strongly correlate with their level of expertise in security. Liu et at.
[4] even tried to measure the distance between the mental models of experts and
lay-persons. Experts are defined in this paper as those who know all the technical
definitions of the security-related words. In a later paper, the authors [4] changed
the definition to “One who has at least five years expertise in security as a
researcher, student or practitioner” (so called security specialist)9. The authors
reported differences between the security specialists and ‘the others’.
Bravo-Lillo et al. [16] report a mental model study on how people (experts
and lay persons) decide whether to ignore or follow security warnings. Experts
are defined by having completed at least one year’s security or privacy course or
at least a one year security or privacy project. They report very clear differences
between novice and expert users and thereby confirmed previously mentioned
research. For example, they found that experts actively looked for vulnerabili-
ties and considered multiple factors when they encountered a potentially risky
situation. Novices, on the other hand, performed fewer security checks. Novices
can either relate a warning to viruses or they consider that there is actually
no problem. Furthermore, novices tended to assess the safety of an action after
they performed it whereas experts tended to be more cautious and assessed the
safety of a task (considering recent actions, sensitivity of information and con-
sequences) before they embarked on it. They also found that novices were more
likely to trust in the ability of large corporations to protect them. Accordingly,
they expected online banking to be secure because banks traditionally have good
security. They confirmed the findings of [111, 45, 63] that novices made decisions
based on the look and feel of a website. On the other hand, experts agreed that
bank websites with warnings were usually not trustworthy. They also identified
9 The second definition is far more appropriate since it represents a higher level of
understanding in terms of Bloom’s [2] well-known taxonomy of the cognitive domain
a misconcept with respect to file storage. Novices believed that storing a file was
more dangerous than opening it They thought that opening the file provided
them with a safe preview but saving the file on their desktop was akin having a
time bomb on their computer: the file posed a danger due to its presence.
Bartsch and Volkamer [9] study in a qualitative card sorting study how lay
and expert users assess risks connected to Web sites. Their results indicate the
diversity of mental models, both between the two groups and between individu-
als, particularly related to their preferences (e.g. concerning privacy or financial
consequences). Bartsch and Volkamer conclude that it is not enough to distin-
guish between experts and lay persons.
Cultural & Demographic Differences. Most of the research on mental
models has been conducted in the USA. Moreover, there are only a few studies
considering cross-cultural issues in mental models of security and privacy. For
instance, Diesner et al. [33] studied mental models of data privacy and security
in India – a country without data protection laws at this point in time. They
conducted interviews with 29 participants and used Network Text Analysis and
map analysis techniques including Auto map [20, 32] to evaluate the transcripts
and NetDraw [14] to visualize the results. They found that personal information,
identity, and knowledge were the central contents while security-related terms
are not central in people’s minds. Later, Kumaraguru et al. [72] conducted an
exploratory study in India and in the USA to compare privacy perceptions and
concerns in the two countries. They suggest that Indians and people from the
US differ with respect to level of concern about privacy, and people from the
USA are more privacy-aware when it comes to new technologies. Kauer et al.
[62] replicated Wash’s folk model study [105] in Germany. They identified some
differences. In particular, they considered the government and the ‘Bundestro-
janer’ as possible threats as well Anonymous and the Chaos Computer Club.
These were not mentioned by participants in Wash’s study.
There is very little research into demographic differences in the context of
mental models. Dourish et al. [36] identified some differences between younger
and older participants in terms of who might threaten them on the Internet:
young people are more likely to identify big organizations as threats than older
ones. Sheng et al. [95] studied the susceptibility of different demographic groups
with respect to phishing. The results may lead to the conclusion that women
are, in general, more susceptible than men and that people between the ages of
18 and 25 will be more susceptible than the older computer users.
Different Environments. The authors of [51] concentrate on the organiza-
tional environment. They do not state this explicitly but it seems as if there is
a mental model considering IT Staff as being responsible for security within or-
ganisations. Thus, it could be expected that people have different mental models
about security at home and at work but this is not specifically addressed in this
paper.
Muslukhov et al. [78], in common with other researchers, noticed differences
between the mental models of home computer and smartphone security. People
assume their smartphone to be a less secure device on which to store sensible
data. They attribute this to the mobility of smartphones which made them more
likely to be lost or stolen. In general, their main concerns are the smartphone
being lost or stolen combined with losing data such as their address book or
someone dialing expensive numbers on their account.
Trust and adoption. Researchers who studied privacy critical applications
have in common that they (indirectly) showed that misconception can lead to
distrust and thus lead to end-users not adopting the proposed technology (e.g. in
[107, 52, 60]). Thereby the confirmed the research from Castelfranchi and Falcone
[21] who studied the relation between mental model in trust in general.
4 Conclusion
To conclude this overview paper, we present some pertinent limitations of mental
model research and suggest directions for future research.
4.1 Limitations
This review of mental model research, with a particular focus on human-centred
security, has revealed uncertainty about the following:
Validity of findings: the findings of current mental model research may not
be applicable in other contexts, because existing research has been carried out
with limitations on:
– Methodology: Most of the studies on mental models are based on self re-
ported data about security behaviour which might or is very likely to be
inaccurate (participants want to be seen as more security and privacy aware
and concious than they actually are) and depends on the context.
– Heterogeneity: most of the studies have been carried out within one coun-
try within a limited area. We could not find any comparative study which
contrasts or compares the findings from one country to that of others. Clearly
the findings of such homogeneous studies need to be replicated in different
contexts in order to confirm, validate, and if possible generalize their find-
ings.
– Time: much of the research seems rather dated in 2013. Mental models are
extremely dynamic, and findings from some years ago are now of questionable
validity.
Design methodology: no attempt has been made to design interfaces to ac-
commodate an understanding of mental models. This might be because these will
probably differ slightly across user populations, and change during the lifetime
of the system.
Measuring mental models: The question of how to identify individual men-
tal models still remains an open question. A number of techniques have been
deployed, as explained in Section 2, but none has so far been identified as being
the best mechanism. Furthermore, it would be necessary to identify the mental
models of a particular user before start using a security mechanism; and this
should not take too much time. In addition, it is unclear how to handle the
dynamic characteristics of mental models.
Identifying experts: There is no clear way to distinguish novices from experts.
It is important to be able to do this, since one might want to use different
metaphors to train them [56] or provide them with different interfaces [3]. One
cannot simply ask people if they are expert, since humans are notoriously bad
at judging their own abilities [38, 71]. One could ask people how long they have
been using a particular technology, but people make use of their time differently,
so time, being a weak indicator, is not a reliable predictor. The traditional way
of assessing knowledge is to set a task to determine whether the person is able
to complete it. That is probably an infeasible approach outside an educational
setting, and, moreover might suffer from the same problems mentioned in the
discussion related to accessing mental models in Section 2.
4.2 Future work
To move forward we need to ascertain how to utilise this knowledge about the
different aspects of mental models. A number of aspects are particularly pre-
scient:
1. How do we identify which mental model(s) a particular user ascribes to in
order to adopt risk communication, education and interfaces accordingly?
Does it mean that we have to ask the user a set of questions before launch-
ing an application? Should the system learn about the mental model(s) by
‘observing” the user’s behaviour as he/she uses the system? How do we de-
tect changes in the user’s mental model(s)?
2. On the other hand, it might be possible to design generic risk communication
techniques, educational efforts and interfaces. It could be that we ought to
design in such a way that is independent of the different concrete mental
model(s) users possess.
3. How do we predict user behaviour based on our understanding of their men-
tal models? There is some research proposing different approaches, such as
Blythe and Camp in [13] who model Wash’s folk models [105] in software
agents according to Gentner and Stevens [48] in a type similar to STRIPS
[42] or in terms of causalities [10] or in terms of a graph [16]. Clearly more
research is needed to consolidate the findings and generate guidelines for
informing design.
4.3 In Closing
This paper has presented an overview of mental model research with particu-
lar application to human-centred security. We do not claim this review to be
exhaustive but it does give a flavour of the applicable research in the area and
highlights areas that require more attention.
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The authors would like to thank Steffen Bartsch for his valuable input.
References
1. A. Adams and M. A. Sasse. Users are not the enemy. Communications of the
ACM, 42(12):40–46, 1999.
2. L. Anderson, D. Krathwohl, P. Airasian, K. Cruikshank, R. Mayer, P. Pintrich,
J. Raths, and M. Wittrock. A taxonomy for learning, teaching, and assessing.
In L. Anderson and D. Krathwohl, editors, A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of
Educational Objectives, Complete Edition, pages 212–218. Longman, 2001.
3. W. Appelt, E. Hinrichs, and G. Woetzel. Effectiveness and efficiency: the need
for tailorable user interfaces on the web. Computer networks and ISDN systems,
30(1):499–508, 1998.
4. F. Asgharpour, D. Liu, and L. J. Camp. Mental models of security risks. In S. Di-
etrich and R. Dhamija, editors, Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 11th
International Conference, FC 2007, and 1st International Workshop on Usable
Security, USEC 2007, Scarborough, Trinidad and Tobago, February 12-16, 2007.
Revised Selected Papers, volume 4886 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
367–377. Springer, 2007.
5. F. Asgharpour, D. Liu, and L. J. Camp. Mental models of computer security
risks. In WEIS: Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Carnegie
Mellon University, 7-8 June 2007.
6. K. Aytes and T. Connolly. Computer security and risky computing practices: A
rational choice perspective. Journal of Organizational and End User Computing
(JOEUC), 16(3):22–40, 2004.
7. K. Bain. What the best college teachers do. Harvard University Press, 2011.
8. M. Bang, D. L. Medin, and S. Atran. Cultural mosaics and mental models of
nature. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(35):13868–13874,
2007.
9. S. Bartsch and M. Model. Effectively communicate risks for diverse users: A
mental-models approach for individualized security interventions [to appear]. In
Informatik Jahrestagung.
10. S. Bartsch, M. Volkamer, H. Theuerling, and F. Karayumak. Contextualized web
warnings, and how they cause distrust. In 6th International Conference on Trust
& Trustworthy Computing, pages 205–222, 17-19 June, London, United Kingdom,
2013.
11. M. J. Bates. The design of browsing and berrypicking techniques for the online
search interface. Online Information Review, 13(5):407–424, 1989.
12. Z. Benenson, F. Gassmann, and L. Reinfelder. Android and iOS users’ differences
concerning security and privacy. In CHI ’13 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, CHI EA ’13, pages 817–822, New York, NY, USA, 2013.
ACM.
13. J. Blythe and L. J. Camp. Implementing mental models. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy Workshops, pages 86–90. IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
14. S. P. Borgatti, M. G. Everett, and L. C. Freeman. UCINET for Windows: Software
for social network analysis. Analytic Technologies, Harvard, 2002.
15. A. Bostrom, B. Fischhoff, and M. G. Morgan. Characterizing mental models of
hazardous processes: A methodology and an application to radon. Journal of
Social Issues, 48(4):85–100, 1992.
16. C. Bravo-Lillo, L. F. Cranor, J. S. Downs, and S. Komanduri. Bridging the gap
in computer security warnings: A mental model approach. Security & Privacy,
9(2):18–26, 2011.
17. M. Buchmann. Teaching knowledge: The lights that teachers live by. Oxford
Review of Education, 13(2):151–164, 1987.
18. D. C. Burgess, M. A. Burgess, and J. Leask. The mmr vaccination and autism
controversy in united kingdom 1998–2005: Inevitable community outrage or a
failure of risk communication? Vaccine, 24(18):3921–3928, 2006.
19. L. J. Camp. Mental models of privacy and security. Technology and Society
Magazine, IEEE, 28(3):37–46, 2006.
20. K. Carley and M. Palmquist. Extracting, representing, and analyzing mental
models. Social Forces, 70(3):601–636, 1992.
21. C. Castelfranchi and R. Falcone. Trust is much more than subjective probability:
Mental components and sources of trust. In System Sciences, 2000. Proceedings of
the 33rd Annual Hawaii International Conference on, pages 10–pp. IEEE, 2000.
22. J.-G. Cegarra-Navarro, S. Eldridge, and A. L. Gamo Sánchez. How an unlearning
context can help managers overcome the negative effects of counter-knowledge.
Journal of Management & Organization, 18(2):231–246, 2012.
23. J. A. Chapman and T. Ferfolja. Fatal flaws: the acquisition of imperfect mental
models and their use in hazardous situations. Journal of Intellectual Capital,
2(4):398–409, 2001.
24. S. Chiasson, P. C. van Oorschot, and R. Biddle. A usability study and critique of
two password managers. In Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium - Volume 15, USENIX-SS’06, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006. USENIX
Association.
25. S. R. Clegg. Ten propositions concerning security, terrorism and business. Global
Business and Economics Review, 10(2):184–196, 2008.
26. D. Conrad. Building knowledge through portfolio learning in prior learning as-
sessment and recognition. Quarterly Review of Distance Education, 9(2):139–150,
2008.
27. S. A. Converse, J. A. Cannon-Bowers, and E. Salas. Team member shared mental
models: A theory and some methodological issues. In Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, volume 35, pages 1417–1421.
SAGE Publications, 1991.
28. K. J. W. Craik. The nature of explanation. Cambridge University Press, 1967.
29. Z. R. Dagher. Review of studies on the effectiveness of instructional analogies in
science education. Science education, 79(3):295–312, 1995.
30. R. G. d’Andrade. The development of cognitive anthropology. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1995.
31. S. Dekker and E. Hollnagel. Human factors and folk models. Cognition, Technol-
ogy & Work, 6(2):79–86, 2004.
32. J. Diesner and K. M. Carley. Automap1.2 - extract, analyze, represent, and
compare mental models from texts. Technical report, CMU, 2004.
33. J. Diesner, P. Kumaraguru, and K. M. Carley. Mental models of data privacy and
security extracted from interviews with Indians. 55th Annual Conference of the
International Communication Association (ICA), New York, May 26-30, 2005.
34. H. Donker, P. Klante, and P. Gorny. The design of auditory user interfaces for
blind users. In Proceedings of the second Nordic conference on Human-computer
interaction, pages 149–156. ACM, 2002.
35. D. Dörner. On the difficulties people have in dealing with complexity. Simulation
& Gaming, 11(1):87–106, 1980.
36. P. Dourish, J. Delgado De La Flor, and M. Joseph. Security as a practical problem:
Some preliminary observations of everyday mental models. In Proceedings of CHI
2003 Workshop on HCI and Security Systems, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 5-10
April 2003.
37. P. Dourish, R. E. Grinter, J. D. De La Flor, and M. Joseph. Security in the wild:
user strategies for managing security as an everyday, practical problem. Personal
and Ubiquitous Computing, 8(6):391–401, 2004.
38. D. Dunning, K. Johnson, J. Ehrlinger, and J. Kruger. Why people fail to recognize
their own incompetence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(3):83–
87, 2003.
39. J. A. Easterbrook. The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization
of behavior. Psychological review, 66(3):183, 1959.
40. W. K. Edwards, E. S. Poole, and J. Stoll. Security automation considered harm-
ful? In Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on New Security Paradigms, pages
33–42. ACM, 2008.
41. A. P. Felt, E. Ha, S. Egelman, A. Haney, E. Chin, and D. Wagner. Android
permissions: user attention, comprehension, and behavior. In Proceedings of the
Eighth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’12, pages 3:1–3:14,
New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
42. R. E. Fikes and N. J. Nilsson. Strips: a new approach to the application of
theorem proving to problem solving. In Proceedings of the 2nd international joint
conference on Artificial intelligence, IJCAI’71, pages 608–620, San Francisco, CA,
USA, 1971. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.
43. B. Fischhoff. Risk perception and communication unplugged: Twenty years of
process1. Risk analysis, 15(2):137–145, 1995.
44. B. Fischhoff, A. Bostrom, and M. J. Quadrel. Risk perception and communication.
Annual review of public health, 14(1):183–203, 1993.
45. B. Friedman, D. Hurley, D. C. Howe, E. Felten, and H. Nissenbaum. Users’
conceptions of web security: A comparative study. In CHI’02 extended abstracts
on Human factors in computing systems, pages 746–747. ACM, 2002.
46. S. M. Furman, M. F. Theofanos, Y.-Y. Choong, and B. Stanton. Basing cyber-
security training on user perceptions. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 10(2):40–49,
2012.
47. S. Furnell, P. Bryant, and A. D. Phippen. Assessing the security perceptions of
personal internet users. Computers & Security, 26(5):410–417, 2007.
48. D. Gentner and A. L. Stevens. Mental models. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New
Jersey, 1983.
49. T. Greenhalgh, C. Helman, and A. M. Chowdhury. Health beliefs and folk models
of diabetes in british bangladeshis: a qualitative study. BMJ: British Medical
Journal, 316(7136):978, 1998.
50. J. B. Gross and M. B. Rosson. End user concern about security and privacy
threats. In L. F. Cranor, editor, SOUPS, volume 229 of ACM International
Conference Proceeding Series, pages 167–168. ACM, 2007.
51. J. B. Gross and M. B. Rosson. Looking for trouble: understanding end-user
security management. In Proceedings of the 2007 Symposium on Computer Human
interaction For the Management of information Technology, page 10. ACM, 2007.
52. S. Gupta and R. P. Bostrom. Theoretical model for investigating the impact
of knowledge portals on different levels of knowledge processing. International
Journal of knowledge and Learning, 1(4):287–304, 2005.
53. M. Harris and S. Furnell. Routes to security compliance: be good or be shamed?
Computer Fraud & Security, 2012(12):12–20, 2012.
54. R. Helm and A. Mark. Implications from cue utilisation theory and signalling
theory for firm reputation and the marketing of new products. International
Journal of Product Development, 4(3):396–411, 2007.
55. C. G. Helman. “feed a cold, starve a fever”folk models of infection in an english
suburban community, and their relation to medical treatment. Culture, Medicine
and Psychiatry, 2(2):107–137, 1978.
56. Y. Hsu. The effects of metaphors on novice and expert learners performance and
mental-model development. Interacting with Computers, 18(4):770–792, 2006.
57. P. N. Johnson-Laird. Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of language,
inference, and consciousness, volume 6. Harvard University Press, 1983.
58. P. N. Johnson-Laird. Mental models and thought. In K. J. Holyoak and R. G.
Morrison, editors, The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning, pages 185–
208. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
59. N. A. Jones, H. Ross, T. Lynam, P. Perez, and A. Leitch. Mental models: an
interdisciplinary synthesis of theory and methods. Ecology and Society, 16(1):46,
2011.
60. F. Karayumak, M. Kauer, M. M. Olembo, T. Volk, and M. Volkamer. User
study of the improved Helios voting system interface. In 1st Workshop on Socio-
Technical Aspects in Security and Trust (STAST), 2011, pages 37–44. IEEE Dig-
ital Library, 2011.
61. Kaspersky. The evolution of phishing attacks: 2011-2013., 2013. http:
//media.kaspersky.com/pdf/Kaspersky_Lab_KSN_report_The_Evolution_of_
Phishing_Attacks_2011-2013.pdf.
62. M. Kauer, S. Günther, D. Storck, and M. Volkamer. A comparison of Ameri-
can and German folk models of home computer security. In Human Aspects of
Information Security, Privacy, and Trust, pages 100–109. Springer, 2013.
63. M. Kauer, F. Kiesel, F. Ueberschaer, M. Volkamer, and R. Bruder. The influ-
ence of trustworthiness of website layout on security perception of websites. In
Current Issues in IT Security 2012, number 18, pages 215–220. 5th MPICC In-
terdisciplinary Conference on Current Issues in IT Security, Freiburg i Breisgau,
Germany, May 7-11, 2012., Duncker & Humblot, 2012.
64. P. G. Kelley, S. Consolvo, L. F. Cranor, J. Jung, N. Sadeh, and D. Wetherall. A
conundrum of permissions: installing applications on an android smartphone. In
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Financial Cryptography and
Data Security, FC’12, pages 68–79, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
65. W. Kempton. Variation in folk models and consequent behavior. American Be-
havioral Scientist; American Behavioral Scientist, 1987.
66. J. Khaslavsky. Integrating culture into interface design. In CHI 98 Cconference
Summary on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’98, pages 365–366,
New York, NY, USA, 1998. ACM.
67. T. Kindberg, A. Sellen, and E. Geelhoed. Security and trust in mobile interac-
tions: A study of users perceptions and reasoning. In UbiComp 2004: Ubiquitous
Computing, pages 196–213. Springer, 2004.
68. J. King. How come I’m allowing strangers to go through my phone? - Smartphones
and privacy expectations;, 2013. http://jenking.net/mobile/.
69. R. Klimoski and S. Mohammed. Team mental model: Construct or metaphor?
Journal of management, 20(2):403–437, 1994.
70. R. B. Kozma. Will media influence learning? Reframing the debate. Educational
technology research and development, 42(2):7–19, 1994.
71. J. Kruger. Lake wobegon be gone! the “below-average effect” and the egocen-
tric nature of comparative ability judgments. Journal of personality and social
psychology, 77(2):221, 1999.
72. P. Kumaraguru, L. F. Cranor, and E. Newton. Privacy perceptions in India and
the United States: An interview study. In The 33rd Research Conference on
Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC), September 2005.
73. J. Langan-Fox, S. Code, and K. Langfield-Smith. Team mental models: Tech-
niques, methods, and analytic approaches. Human Factors: The Journal of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 42(2):242–271, 2000.
74. J. Lin, S. Amini, J. I. Hong, N. Sadeh, J. Lindqvist, and J. Zhang. Expectation
and purpose: understanding users’ mental models of mobile app privacy through
crowdsourcing. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous Com-
puting, UbiComp ’12, pages 501–510, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
75. D. C. Littman, J. Pinto, S. Letovsky, and E. Soloway. Mental models and software
maintenance. Journal of Systems and Software, 7(4):341–355, 1987.
76. D. Liu, F. Asgharpour, and L. Camp. Risk communication in
security using mental models, 2008. Usable Security Website:
http://usablesecurity.org/papers/liu.pdf.
77. D. Morey and T. Frangioso. Aligning an organization for learning-the six princi-
ples of effective learning. Journal of Knowledge Management, 1(4):308–314, 1997.
78. I. Muslukhov, Y. Boshmaf, C. Kuo, J. Lester, and K. Beznosov. Understanding
users’ requirements for data protection in smartphones. In Data Engineering
Workshops (ICDEW), 2012 IEEE 28th International Conference on, pages 228–
235. IEEE, 2012.
79. K. Nemire. Case study: The wrong mental model can kill you. In Proceedings of
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, volume 51, pages
554–558. Sage Publications, 2007.
80. D. Norman. Some observations on mental models. In D. Gentner and A. Stevens,
editors, Mental Models. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1983.
81. M. M. Olembo, S. Bartsch, and M. Volkamer. Mental models of verifiability
in voting. In V. T. Steve Schneider, James Heather, editor, 4th International
Conference on e-Voting and Identity (VoteID13), volume 7985 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 142 – 155. Springer, July 2013.
82. G. L. Orgill, G. W. Romney, M. G. Bailey, and P. M. Orgill. The urgency for
effective user privacy-education to counter social engineering attacks on secure
computer systems. In Proceedings of the 5th conference on Information technology
education, pages 177–181. ACM, 2004.
83. S. J. Payne. A descriptive study of mental models. Behaviour & Information
Technology, 10(1):3–21, 1991.
84. J. Pfeffer. Changing mental models: HR’s most important task. Human Resource
Management, 44(2):123–128, 2005.
85. F. Raja, K. Hawkey, S. Hsu, K.-L. Wang, and K. Beznosov. Promoting a physical
security mental model for personal firewall warnings. In CHI ’11 Extended Ab-
stracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI EA ’11, pages 1585–1590,
New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
86. F. Raja, K. Hawkey, P. Jaferian, K. Beznosov, and K. S. Booth. It’s too compli-
cated, so I turned it off! Expectations, perceptions, and misconceptions of per-
sonal firewalls. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Assurable and usable
security configuration, pages 53–62. ACM, 2010.
87. A. R. Rao and K. B. Monroe. The moderating effect of prior knowledge on cue
utilization in product evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, pages 253–264,
1988.
88. K. Renaud. Blaming noncompliance is too convenient: What really causes infor-
mation breaches? Security & Privacy, IEEE, 10(3):57–63, 2012.
89. G. P. Richardson, D. F. Andersen, T. A. Maxwell, and T. R. Stewart. Founda-
tions of mental model research. In Proceedings of the 1994 International System
Dynamics Conference, pages 181–192, 1994.
90. I. T. Robertson. Human information-processing strategies and style. Behaviour
& Information Technology, 4(1):19–29, 1985.
91. W. B. Rouse and N. M. Morris. On looking into the black box: Prospects and
limits in the search for mental models. Psychological bulletin, 100(3):349, 1986.
92. A. L. Rowe and N. J. Cooke. Measuring mental models: Choosing the right tools
for the job. Human resource development quarterly, 6(3):243–255, 1995.
93. D. E. Rumelhart and D. A. Norman. Representation in memory. Cognitive Sci-
ence Laboratory, Center for Human Information Processing, University of Cali-
fornia, San Diego, 1983.
94. S. E. Schechter, R. Dhamija, A. Ozment, and I. Fischer. The emperor’s new
security indicators. In Security and Privacy, 2007. SP’07. IEEE Symposium on,
pages 51–65. IEEE, 2007.
95. S. Sheng, M. Holbrook, P. Kumaraguru, L. F. Cranor, and J. Downs. Who falls
for phish?: a demographic analysis of phishing susceptibility and effectiveness of
interventions. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, CHI ’10, pages 373–382, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
96. D. J. Simons and D. T. Levin. Change blindness. Trends in cognitive sciences,
1(7):261–267, 1997.
97. P. Slovic. Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799):280–285, 1987.
98. J. L. Spears and H. Barki. User participation in information systems security risk
management. MIS quarterly, 34(3):503–522, 2010.
99. N. Staggers and A. F. Norcio. Mental models: concepts for human-computer
interaction research. International Journal of Man-machine studies, 38(4):587–
605, 1993.
100. B. M. Staw and S. G. Barsade. Affect and managerial performance: A test of
the sadder-but-wiser vs. happier-and-smarter hypotheses. Administrative Science
Quarterly, pages 304–331, 1993.
101. K. S. Taber. Mediating mental models of metals: Acknowledging the priority of
the learner’s prior learning. Science Education, 87(5):732–758, 2003.
102. A. Thatcher and M. Greyling. Mental models of the internet. International
journal of industrial ergonomics, 22(4):299–305, 1998.
103. B. Tversky. Cognitive maps, cognitive collages, and spatial mental models. In
Spatial Information Theory A Theoretical Basis for GIS, pages 14–24. Springer,
1993.
104. S. Vosniadou and W. F. Brewer. Mental models of the earth: A study of conceptual
change in childhood. Cognitive psychology, 24(4):535–585, 1992.
105. R. Wash. Folk models of home computer security. In Proceedings of the Sixth
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, page 11. ACM, 2010.
106. R. Wash and E. Rader. Influencing mental models of security: a research agenda.
In Proceedings of the 2011 workshop on New security paradigms workshop, NSPW
’11, pages 57–66, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
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